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as a knowledge of realities. But I shall not repeat what I have said in the paper referred to.

One thing, however, is worthy of remark. We are told that in "actual life" (p. 298) or in "immediate experience" (p. 314) there are neither material bodies nor immaterial minds, but "simply sentient and purposive beings and the environment of things to which they have to adjust themselves." But what shall we understand by "actual life"? Shall we take it to mean the first feeble glimmerings of the infantile consciousness? Here, of course, there is no distinction of material bodies and immaterial minds. But there is also no recognition of sentient and purposive beings and their environment.

Shall we understand by the phrase, actual life as it is experienced by the grown man? The grown man, however unscientific, is certainly conscious of the distinction between mind and body, though he may find it hard to define it. Indeed, I think we shall find that the developing intelligence is always able to understand what is meant by *body* and *mind* and the *world,* quite as soon as it is able to grasp what is meant by *sentient and purposive beings and their environment of things.* As a matter of fact, the one expression means just what the other does; the only difference is that the latter is couched in the language of the philosopher, which has the disadvantage of being more unfamiliar than the language of common life.

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DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR PERRY ON PRAGMATISM

IN the innumerable replies and rejoinders of pragmatists to their critics there has been a pretty constant and often almost plaintive contention that much of the critic's case against the pragmatist is due to the fact that the critic at some point attributes his own conceptions to the pragmatist and then exhibits in triumph the impossibility of harmonizing these conceptions with other pragmatic doctrines.

In his interesting and able review of pragmatism (Nos. 14 and 16 of the current volume of this JOURNAL), Professor Perry has obviously aimed to avoid this. And in a larger measure than usual among the critics, he has succeeded. However, it seems to me that

in spite of this good intention there are some passages that are likely to call out the old complaint.

Professor Perry's interpretation of the factors involved in the pragmatist's view of the logical process is:

"1. *Reality, or Beliefs already Fixed.*—This element of experience is the object (this term now appearing for the first time) in so far as already known. The pragmatists would seem to disagree among themselves as to whether sensation belongs to this category or to the next. Let us designate this factor of the situation by the letter *M*.

"2. *The Object as Problematic.*—This is the disturbing factor, consisting in a sensation as yet unresolved, or in a general discord which makes the situation practically unworkable. Let us designate this factor as *X*.

"3. *Ideas, or,* to quote Professor Moore's phrase, *'Instruments of Reconstruction.'*—These elements, which we may designate as *a'*, *b'*, *c'*, are tentative interpretations of *X* and mark the period of deliberative hesitation.

"4. *The Noetic Interest.*—Herein appears for the first time the subject or the knower himself, experienced as a particular need actively attempting to relieve itself. Let us designate this as *S*. *S* is not to be identified through its content so much as through its 'polar' relation to *O*."

With the understanding that in equating the datum or fact element with reality, the latter must be taken in a strictly logical, not a metaphysical, sense (since metaphysically the ideas are as real as the reality in paragraph 1), and with the agreement that the fixity of this reality is not absolute, most pragmatists would, I think, accept the essence of the first three paragraphs. But the fourth is pretty sure to raise a protest at once. Here, it will be said, is where the imputations begin. First, the protestor will say, the very heading of the paragraph, especially since it appears independent of the ideas in 3, suggests an anti-pragmatic view—that of a pure, isolated, and sufficient-unto-itself noetic interest. The pragmatist speaks freely of interest *as* noetic, but he is likely to shy a little at the noetic interest when it appears as something over and above ideas. He is likely to say that one form of the issue between pragmatism and its critics is precisely whether the noetic activity is a special and original form of interest or only a function *of* or *in* interest.

On the relation of the noetic interest to the ideas in 3, the objector will probably insist that the noetic interest, or, rather, the noetic phase *of* interest, is carried by the ideas, and will inquire how there can be a noetic interest outside of ideas.

But if there is any question about the anti-pragmatic character of the heading of paragraph 4, many pragmatists will be sure that there is none in what follows about the necessity of a subject or knower over and above or under, at any rate in addition to, the ideas in the logical process. On the preceding page Professor Perry quotes from Professor Dewey's article[1] on "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge" and presumably must have read the entire article. In that article is the following: "The second [referring to the view that the object is immediately known by a subject] is a pseudo-immediacy, which in the same breath that it proclaims its immediacy smuggles in another term (and one which is unexperienced both in itself and in its relation), the subject, or consciousness, to which to relate the immediate." Again: "It is the identification of presence in consciousness with knowledge as such that leads to setting up a mind (ego, subject) which has the peculiar property of knowing (only so often it knows wrong!)." To this might be added: "The moment it is recognized that the logical fact-meaning duality is not to be identified with the technological object-agent duality, a large part of the present confusion of logic and of psychological epistemology clears itself up—it simply evaporates."[2]

Yet in the face of this, not to mention the steady stream of similar doctrine from Professor James and Dr. Schiller, we find the "polar relation" between a subject, on the one hand, and an object, on the other, set forth as the pragmatist's own view of the noetic process!

To be sure, pragmatists do not all state the logical process alike. It is described now "as a relation or interaction between ideas and things," and again "as a relation or interaction between things *through* ideas." Whether in the end these two statements come to the same thing, they certainly do not regard a subject or knower in addition to ideas as necessary to the logical process as such. This does not say that there is no knower, nor does it imply that there is no self. It means that whatever of a self there is, it appears in the logical process only as the ideating activity. The idea is the self *as* knower and therefore *is* the knower. And in support of this the objector would probably ask just what logical function does this extra-ideational subject or knower perform which the idea does not.

That this is one of the cases of attribution of the reviewer's own ideas of which the pragmatist has so often complained, seems clear from the identity between the conception of knowledge attributed to the pragmatist in this paragraph and that upon which Professor

[1] *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XV., No. 59.

[2] This JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 255.

Perry bases his objections to pragmatism throughout the discussion. The principal theses of Professor Perry's own view appear to be: (1) that truth must "envisage" or "coincide" with or be "identical" with reality (pp. 372, 374, 422); (2) that the object "is the element which plays the determining part in the constitution of truth" (p. 374); and (3) that the only purpose or intention to which truth is relative is just "the intention to know . . . not the intention to put the knowledge to some use" (p. 368). So here in this interpretation of the pragmatist's view the subject or knower is further described: (1) as "a particular need" or interest which is satisfied when the object as problematic is "assimilated to" or "becomes homogeneous with" *M*, which is reality as fixed; (2) at the close of the paragraph the noetic problem appears also as that of overcoming the "objectivity or difference" of the object from *S*, the subject. In his summary at the close of his second article Professor Perry speaks of the problem entirely in terms of the relation between the knower, not the idea, and the object.

At any rate, pragmatists will hardly accept either of these statements as it stands. They will insist that the essence of the logical problem does not lie in the opposition between a self and an object, nor does the process of solution consist in "assimilating" the object as unknown "to beliefs or reality already fixed." In all the accounts I have read, pragmatists insist that knowing consists as much in the assimilation of the already known to the new as the reverse; that the already known is not finally known once and forever; that in new situations it has to be reknown. But still, since the new develops out of the old, the old is sufficient to serve as a base for further operations. But while a base is the *relatively* fixed element, it must nevertheless be movable unless our march is to be ever in a circle. Over and over pragmatists have insisted that "the given" is a point of *departure* rather than a fixed stake to which we are bound hard and fast. Of course, after the departure there is a return to the given, but only to discover that the work done during the departure necessitates a reconstruction of the given with which or from which we started.

The same point is raised at the beginning of the second paper, where Professor Perry says: "According to the pragmatist's own analysis, the satisfaction is legitimate and sound *when a judgment has been found which is consistent with that which is accepted as real.*" Now it is quite possible to interpret this pragmatically. But it is quite certain from the context that Professor Perry does not so interpret it. For I think by "that which is accepted as real" Professor Perry means that which is accepted as unalterably real *before*

the judgment is made. And for "consistent" with he uses elsewhere "coincident," "identical" and "homogeneous" with. But for the pragmatist "that which is accepted as real," *i. e.*, as *logically* real, is one factor *in* the judging process, not something *outside* to which the whole judgment must conform. Moreover, that which is accepted as real in the *beginning* of the judging act is so accepted *provisionally*, and may be quite different from that which is accepted as real at the *end* of the process. And if Professor Perry should say that it is this latter which he has in mind, the rejoinder would be that the judgment is no more made to consist with this than this is made to consist with the judgment, for this reality at the *end* is a reality with all the work of judging in it and never could be experienced without this operation. An ox or a monkey may die of tuberculosis, but he does not *experience* tuberculosis. That is reserved for a being who can *through* science, *through* thought, make a connection between the pains, fever, etc., and a certain kind of bacteria.

Passing from Professor Perry's exposition of pragmatism to some of his criticisms, his first point is that while he accepts the pragmatist's doctrine that truth and error are always relative to some intention, yet we must remember that that intention is nothing but the intention to know. This reminds one of Bradley's, Royce's, and Taylor's treatment of the categories of consistency, harmony, unity, etc. They tell us that the meaning of these categories is "always relative to some particular problem and purpose," but when we ask to *what* particular purpose their application to absolute reality is relative, we are told simply to "the purpose to be consistent, harmonious, unified, etc." So also the idea is a form of will, but its only will is to know, that is, to be an idea. Formally this looks like a vicious circle.

But, formalities aside, as above the issue was between the noetic interest and interest *as* noetic, so here it is between the intention to know and knowing *as* intention. In short, we are back to the original question,—Just what *is* the process of knowing, and what is an idea? There is very little directly on these questions in Professor Perry's papers. Perhaps he thinks the announcement of his standpoint as realism should be sufficient. But there are so many brands of realism these days that one must have some details. However, the following general statements may give a line on Professor Perry's position. In the concluding paragraph of the first paper he says: "In this criticism I have not resorted to a general and vague insistence that true knowledge must 'correspond' to its object. I agree with the pragmatist that this is to take refuge in confusion." Yet

elsewhere we find the following: "A judgment is true in so far as it *coincides* with a proposition or complex entity which is found with its distinguishing character upon it and its consistency about it" (p. 379; italics mine). "So far as truth is concerned, the important element of the situation is identity or consistency with reality" (p. 422). "For realism truth consists in an experience of identification, such as, 'Here is a or $M + a$.' . . . Because it is truth it must envisage reality" (p. 374).

But if to state the relation between the idea or the subject and the object as one of correspondence "is to take refuge in confusion," it is difficult to see how a substitution of "coincidence," "identity" or "envisaging" for "correspondence" mends the matter. Most of those who think "correspondence" confusing are likely to find in "coincidence" and "identity" confusion doubly confounded. At any rate, it seems to me that in spite of Professor Perry's disavowal of correspondence, it is difficult to see what these passages mean if not a good old-fashioned envisaging, photographic realism.

Now, there is a realism, a functional, a dynamic or "operative" realism, which has very close affiliations with pragmatism. A realism, namely, which teaches that ideas lead into and help bring about other experiences different from themselves. In this difference between the ideas and the other experiences which yet allows a free passage from one to the other consists the realism. With the old realism it holds to the difference between the idea and its realization, but it contends that this difference consists in something more than that one is an envisager of the other.

If Professor Perry's realism is of the photographic, envisaging type, it seems in order to recall once more the questions which pragmatists from the beginning have been urging—questions which no one so far has dealt with directly and specifically—such questions as: If truth consists in identity and coincidence between an idea and reality, just what then is the significance of the *difference* between an idea and reality? Why when we have one do we want the other? And if there is a difference, must not truth be defined as much in terms of this *difference* as of the identity? Again, when there is *doubt* about the correspondence or coincidence or identity of the idea with reality, how is the doubt resolved? What is the criterion of successful identification? Yet again, if the object is the determining factor and the object is always there, how can there ever be any uncertainty? How can there be any *problem* of knowledge, to begin with? Why should the object ever fail to determine, or determine falsely? And if the object isn't always there, how can it always be the determining factor?

There is a proneness on the part of the critics to keep the discussion to the nature of truth as a *product,* whereas the pragmatists insist on the problem of *doubt, inquiry* and *error.* This tendency to take truth as a product only appears in Professor Perry's interpretation of the pragmatist's view of the relation between truth and use. Professor Perry speaks of the pragmatist's appeal to "the use of truth" in a way which makes the use begin *after* the truth is reached. But the use with which the pragmatist is concerned is the use of an *idea* in establishing *its* truth. The pragmatist could readily agree that *after* the truth of an idea is established the continued use of it in *similar* situations would not affect its truth.

The meaning of this may become clearer if we follow Professor Perry's illustration. He says (p. 368): "I may intend to vote for the man with the cleanest record, and proceed to discover him; but it is the latter intention alone, the intention to discover that one among the candidates who has the cleanest record, to which my ensuing belief is relative as respects its truth or error." Now I think a little analysis shows that the relation between the intention to discover the cleanest candidate and the intention to vote, and, therefore, the relation between the truth of the idea of who is the cleanest and the intention to vote, is much closer than Professor Perry allows. Of course, Professor Perry would grant that there is a pretty intimate relation of *motivation* between the intention to vote and the intention to find the cleanest candidate, but he will insist that the content of the latter is already there as a separate and independent affair "with its distinguishing characters upon it." But is it? What is the meaning of the cleanest candidate? Suppose there were no voting, no office-holding, no political party, would there be a cleanest candidate? It probably would be quibbling to insist that in such a case there could be no "candidate" at all. So let that be waived and let the question be, Would there be any cleanest man in the sense here meant, that is, *politically* cleanest? Does not the concept "clean" here mean a man to be voted for, to be put into office, to be entrusted with funds, etc.? Again, Professor Perry's conception of the cleanest man is different from that of the ward heeler; for the latter the cleanest man is the one who will be "white" to his friends. However, in either event, Professor Perry's case rests upon the assumption that the cleanness is there quite independent of the voting, and that the voting occurs because of the cleanness. But once more, suppose the whole voting system, with all that it implies, never to have started, would the *kind* of cleanness here sought still be there? If not, is it not just as obvious that political cleanness exists because of the voting, as the voting because of the cleanness? However, neither of

these antithetical statements of the situation does it justice, for the quality of cleanness and the activity of voting develop together as mutually conditioning differentiations within what Professor James calls the same social "*fundamentum.*"

Following the illustration into the question of use raised above, suppose we have reached the point where the idea of *A*-as-a-clean-man emerges. In so far as there is only an idea there is not certainty. We "think" *A* is a clean man. How is this hypothesis to be verified or rejected? How, indeed, except by using, by following this idea until it leads or fails to lead to further experiences of *A's* cleanness sufficient to satisfy the demands of the original problem of whom to vote for.

No pragmatist has ever held that the transition from one experience to another, or, if the word experience is objectionable, the movement from one reality to another, takes place in a vacuum. He has never taught, as some might gather from some of the critics, that ideas create new reality out of the air. He speaks of the further development and reconstruction of experience or reality *through* ideas; of the idea as the form reality or experience takes to maintain and further itself. Of course the idea can not lead to a new experience unless the *material* for the experience exists. But the pragmatist holds, on the other hand, that before the appearance of the *idea* of a-politically-clean-man (still keeping to the illustration), that whatever quality men as husbands, fathers, merchants may have, these qualities are yet only possible material for political cleanness and become the "real" political cleanness as they cooperate with the idea of political cleanness. The idea of political cleanness transforms this material into political cleanness by bringing to it, or bringing it to, the demands of a new problem. And the pragmatist holds that this is a *real* transformation, that the idea brings things, *i. e.*, already organized activities, into new relations of interaction which result in a new reality. No doubt the paper with which I have just kindled the fire was already there, but it was not there *as kindling* until the *idea* of kindling appeared. It was through this idea that it came into relation with my hands, with the match, the wood, etc. So it is through the idea of political cleanness that *A's* qualities as husband, father, merchant, etc., are turned into a new direction and thereby undergo some actual qualitative change. The *real* political cleanness, then, is not there independent of and determining the *idea* of political cleanness. It is there only in *relation* to this idea. The idea is as much a determinant of the reality as is the already existing material. The whole matter is that the idea *and* the already existing material, the habits of father, husband, merchant, etc., are together working out a new reality.

But, it may be said, granting that prior to the idea of political activity there is only the material for political cleanness, even so this material must be recognized as material for that end and not some other, and this in a purely envisaging, photographic fashion. In other words, there must be the direct identification of the material. But the pragmatist could not allow the begging of this point under the term "identification." He will insist that the question here is, once more, What is identification? And will insist that it does not consist in an experience of identity between the idea and the thing, but the material is identified *as* it is found to *satisfy* the demand which the idea expresses. It is no more "identical" with the idea than food is identical with hunger. The relation is one of stimulus and response rather than one of identity, unless, indeed, we are willing to interpret identity as that which responds to and satisfies the demand which the idea defines and makes specific.

Professor Perry thinks that whatever strength the pragmatist's position has is due largely to the fact that he has selected for his illustration what he calls "truths of use" to the neglect of "simple perception," "in which the cognitive moment is seen to the best advantage" (p. 373). "To know," says Professor Perry, "is to see, whether with the bodily eye or with the eye of the soul" (p. 366). But is the case so simple as this? If knowing is just seeing, where does error come in? What distinguishes good from bad seeing? And is the reply of the Greeks to this, that the seeing is bad only in so far as it is not-seeing, sufficient? Also does not this conception of knowledge sink the distinction between immediate realizing experience and the mediating knowing experience? Surely there is a seeing that is not knowing. My seeing of a sun-lit cloud usually is not primarily cognitive. As I thread my way through a crowded street I am "seeing," but unless we are to abandon the distinction between practical and cognitive experiences the seeing here is a form of doing just as much as the walking. For the pragmatist seeing is knowing *only* when it occurs in connection with an *inquiry*. It seems impossible for the critic to *keep* in mind that for the pragmatist *knowing is inquiring and knowledge is the result of inquiry*.

In this sense of belonging to a process of inquiry all truths or, rather, all ideas, are ideas of use. If sense perception can be simply given out of all connection with any sort of inquiry, it is not, as such, for the pragmatist cognitive. It is then directly practical or esthetic. Once more, suppose there is *doubt* and consequent inquiry about a case of sense perception, what would be Professor Perry's account of its resolution?

The crucial thesis in pragmatism, Professor Perry says, is this:

"The mark of the truth of knowledge is the satisfying character of the practical transition from cognitive expectation to fulfillment, or of the resolution of doubt into practical immediacy" (p. 371). In spite of the care which Professor Perry says he gave to phrasing this, the term "mark" still appears ambiguous. Ordinarily it means criterion, sign, or test. In this sense the thesis would be a familiar enough pragmatic doctrine. But then it would lose its crucial character for Professor Perry. The crucial character appears in Professor Perry's revision of the thesis a little further on, in which he says: "The essence of the matter is the degree to which the satisfying character of the crucial moment *constitutes* its truth." Here, "mark" means "constitution," which is quite a different affair from "criterion" or "test," and is one for which Professor Perry should have given chapter and verse, for I am sure no pragmatist will own it. For the pragmatist, the truth of an idea consists in its capacity to "lead" to the experience which it promises. And as stated above, in discussing Professor Perry's illustration, this capacity is neither a matter of chance nor by the grace of the absolute, but is due to the fact that the idea is born out of that very *"fundamentum"* of "reality" or "experience" (what you will) in which it works. Professor Perry well says, "There must be a ground for this satisfaction." It is just this ground which, absolutism having failed to supply, the pragmatist has sought in the immediate activities of social life.

Professor Perry's remarks on the last topic—"Knowledge Modifies and Adds to Being"—have perhaps been sufficiently anticipated. However, the issue between Professor Perry's realism and pragmatism is here very sharply drawn and calls for an additional word. Professor Perry's point is, of course, that objects known are "not essentially modified" by the act of knowing. (I wonder just how much reservation the qualifier "essentially" carries.) Professor Perry would grant, I suppose, that if the act of knowing as such does not essentially modify the object known, it in some mysterious way *leads* to acts that do. But if the alteration does not begin in the knowing process, where does it begin? In what way does the knowing lead to the activity that does alter the object? If I am hungry and bethink me of a sandwich on the sideboard, and if I say that the act of thinking does not essentially modify the sandwich, where does the "essential" modification begin? When I reach for it? When I touch it? At the first bite, or the second?[3]

[3] These questions bring up the entire subject of qualities and relations, into which we can not go here. But it is interesting to note that Mr. Bradley finds an envisaging knowledge of reality impossible just because the establishing of new relationships is the beginning of "essential" modifications.

Professor Perry here appeals to knowledge of past and future objects and events as the crucial support of his denial of the real efficacy of thought. At the same time he contends that past and future objects and events have as real an existence as the present. I am not prepared to discuss this point in detail, but shall say that *if* they do so exist and can enter into new relation with each other and with the present, then they must be subject to modification in the same sense as the present.

In concluding Professor Perry says: "It seems absurd to contend that knowledge makes the world." But who has so contended? The pragmatist's contention is that knowledge *helps* to make, in the sense of assisting in remaking, the world. Professor Perry concedes, however, that "knowledge does make *its* world." "It may even be said to make *our* world. But there is a tremendous significance, practical, philosophical and religious, in this difference between our world and *the* world." In appreciation of this "tremendous significance" the pragmatist would yield to no one. Indeed, it was by just this "tremendous significance" that the pragmatist was conceived and brought forth. But for him this "tremendous significance" is that in so far as the distinction between *our* world ("our" including all conscious beings) and *the* world is widened by just so far the abyss of phenomenalism and skepticism is opened.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A Primer of General Method. Being an Introduction to Educational Theory and Practise on the Basis of Logic. SIDNEY EDWARD LANG. Toronto: The Clark Co. 1906. Pp. x + 224.

This volume, as its subtitle indicates, is a consideration of the bearing of logic upon educational theory and practise. It is especially designed for instruction in normal schools, and is evidently written with this end in view. The author has succeeded through clear statement and suggestive illustration in sustaining the interest of the reader throughout. His discussion of the theory of logic is given in simple language relieved of all technical terminology and formal rules. The subject-matter of the book is divided into four parts: Part I., The General Nature of Knowledge; Part II., Judgment and Inference; Part III., Systems and System-making; Part IV., Concrete Problems of Education. To the main body of the work there is appended a set of questions and exercises.

The author's point of view is that of unqualified pragmatism. An adequate criticism of his theories would involve a complete review of the